Because, the Internet: The Limits of Online Campaign Finance Disclosure by Kats, Vitaliy
Florida Law Review
Volume 67 | Issue 4 Article 6
March 2016
Because, the Internet: The Limits of Online
Campaign Finance Disclosure
Vitaliy Kats
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons
This Case Comment is brought to you for free and open access by UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Florida Law
Review by an authorized administrator of UF Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact outler@law.ufl.edu.
Recommended Citation
Vitaliy Kats, Because, the Internet: The Limits of Online Campaign Finance Disclosure, 67 Fla. L. Rev. 1513 (2016).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol67/iss4/6
1513 
BECAUSE, THE INTERNET: THE LIMITS OF ONLINE 
CAMPAIGN FINANCE DISCLOSURE 
 
McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014) 
Vitaliy Kats* 
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................... 1513 
 
 I. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF DISCLOSURE IN 
  CAMPAIGN FINANCE ............................................................. 1514 
 
 II. MCCUTCHEON AND THE INCREASING POWER 
  OF THE INTERNET .................................................................. 1517 
 
 III. THE LIMITS OF PURE DISCLOSURE ........................................ 1518 
 
CONCLUSION ....................................................................................... 1522 
 
INTRODUCTION 
During the 2011–2012 election cycle, Shaun McCutcheon contributed 
$33,088 to sixteen different candidates for federal office.1 McCutcheon’s 
donations complied with the base limits the Federal Election Commission 
(FEC) set for contributions to individual candidates.2 McCutcheon 
wanted to contribute more but was barred by the FEC’s aggregate limit 
on contributions.3 In June of 2012, McCutcheon and the Republication 
National Committee (RNC) filed a complaint before a three-judge panel 
of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.4 McCutcheon and 
the RNC claimed that the aggregate limits on contributions to candidates 
and political committees were unconstitutional under the First 
Amendment.5 The three-judge panel granted the Government’s motion to 
                                                                                                                     
 * J.D. Candidate, 2015, University of Florida Levin College of Law; B.B.A. and B.A., 
2012, Emory University. Thank you to my family for loving and supporting me unconditionally 
throughout my life. Thank you to the staff of the Florida Law Review for their diligent editing. 
Finally, thank you to Professor Charles W. Collier, whose SCOTUS workshop seminar was 
responsible for creating this Comment. 
 1. McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1443 (2014). 
 2. Id. The base limits were codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)–(2) (2012) (to be recodified 
on Jan. 1, 2016 as 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(1)–(2)).  
 3. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1443. 
 4. Verified Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 1, McCutcheon v. FEC, 
893 F. Supp. 2d 133 (D.D.C. 2012) (No. 1:12-cv-01034-JEB-JRB-RLW); McCutcheon, 893 F. 
Supp. 2d 133, rev’d and remanded, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014). 
 5. McCutcheon, 893 F. Supp. at 135, 137. The limits prevent individuals from contributing 
more than $37,500 in total to candidates and their authorized committees, and $57,500 “in the 
case of any other contributions, of which not more than $37,500 may be attributable to 
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dismiss, holding that the aggregate limits are constitutional because they 
prevent circumvention of the base limits.6 McCutcheon and the RNC then 
appealed directly to the Supreme Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1253.7 The 
Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s decision and struck down the 
aggregate campaign contribution limits—established by the Federal 
Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA)8—on the grounds that the limits 
were an unnecessary burden on freedom of association under the First 
Amendment.9 The Court observed that the environment of campaign 
finance disclosure was far more transparent in the age of the Internet.10 
The Court reasoned that the Internet allows access to an unprecedented 
level of information regarding campaign contributions and may actually 
render certain outdated campaign finance restrictions moot.11  
I.  A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF DISCLOSURE IN CAMPAIGN FINANCE 
Congress took its first major stab at comprehensive campaign finance 
reform in 1971 with FECA.12 This Act restricted “the amount of money 
that candidates could personally contribute to their campaigns, limited 
what could be spent on media advertising, and required disclosure of 
                                                                                                                     
contributions to political committees which are not political committees of national political 
parties.” 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(3) (to be recodified on Jan. 1, 2016 as 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(3)). 
 6. McCutcheon, 893 F. Supp. at 140–42. 
 7. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1444 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1253). 
 8. 2 U.S.C. §§ 431–457 (to be recodified on Jan. 1, 2016 as 52 U.S.C. §§ 30101–30146). 
The specific provision containing the aggregate limits is 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(3). 
 9. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1456, 1462.  
 10. Brief of Cause of Action Institute as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants at 11–12, 
17, McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014) (No. 12-536), 2013 WL 2102847 [hereinafter 
Cause of Action Brief]. The majority decision in McCutcheon cited this brief in support of its 
argument. 134 S. Ct. at 1460.  
 11. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1460.  
 12. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) (codified 
as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431–457). While FECA was arguably the first comprehensive federal 
campaign finance law, one of the very first federal campaign finance measures was the Publicity 
of Political Contributions Act of 1910, which called for limited disclosure of receipts and 
expenditures in elections for the U.S. House of Representatives. See Richard Briffault, Campaign 
Finance Disclosure 2.0, 9 ELECTION L.J. 273, 273 (2010). The first federal attempt at piecemeal 
campaign finance reform was the Tillman Act of 1907, 34 Stat. 864. But weak enforcement and 
a plethora of loopholes made the Tillman Act virtually worthless in stemming the tide of corporate 
money. See Francis Bingham, Show Me the Money: Public Access and Accountability After 
Citizens United, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1027, 1048 (2011). Congress attempted to remedy the 
weaknesses of the law by passing various statutes that predated FECA, none of which were 
comprehensive in their own right. See Jessica Furst, Money and Politics: Will Expenditure Limits 
Take Candidates out of the Money Race and Put Them Back in the Office?, 59 FLA. L. REV. 873, 
881 (2007). 
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campaign contributions and expenditures.”13 Despite the seeming 
comprehensiveness of the initial restrictions, the Watergate scandal 
prompted another round of reforms very soon after FECA’s initial 
passage and resulted in the 1974 amendments to FECA.14 These 
amendments represent the origin of the contribution caps that would 
ultimately be at issue in McCutcheon.15  
Almost immediately following the 1974 FECA amendments, 
disgruntled politicians challenged the contribution caps in the landmark 
case of Buckley v. Valeo.16 The politicians argued that limits on 
contributions and expenditures violated the First Amendment rights of 
candidates and their donors.17 Although the Buckley opinion addressed 
numerous facets of campaign finance law, the Court focused on the 
constitutionality of FECA disclosure requirements.18 The Buckley Court 
upheld these requirements, articulating numerous government interests in 
stopping corruption,19 but noted that disclosure, was “only a partial 
measure” and insufficient to prevent corruption.20  
Political parties were ultimately able to circumvent FECA by using 
“soft money” and “issue advocacy.”21 These twin concerns would lead to 
yet another round of amendments to FECA—the Bipartisan Campaign 
                                                                                                                     
 13. Brandi Cherie Sablatura, Reformation of 527 Organizations: Closing the Soft Money 
Loophole Created by the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, 66 LA. L. REV. 809, 817 
(2006). 
 14. FECA Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 (amending FECA, 86 
Stat. 3); Anthony Corrado, The Promise of Campaign Finance Reform Has Largely Been Broken, 
N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/06/13/did-any-good-
come-of-watergate/the-promise-of-campaign-reform-has-largely-been-broken. 
 15. FECA Amendments § 101. 
 16. 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
 17. Id. at 11.  
 18. Id. at 68. 
 19. Id. at 25, 66–67, 143. In its holding, the Court relied on the “conclusion that the 
requirement was narrowly tailored to . . . providing voters with information about candidates; 
deterring actual corruption and the appearance thereof by exposing large contributions and 
expenditures to the light of publicity; and facilitating government data-gathering necessary to 
detect violations of [FECA’s] contribution limits.” Lindsey Powell, Getting Around 
Circumvention: A Proposal for Taking FECA Online, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1499, 1530 (2006). 
Importantly, the Court described disclosure as “the least restrictive means of curbing the evils of 
campaign ignorance and corruption.” Id. at 1529 (emphasis added) (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 
68). 
 20. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 28. 
 21. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 123, 126 (2003), overruled in part by Citizens United 
v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010). Soft money is “money donated to the national parties to 
support state and local grassroots organizing or get out the vote efforts.” Daniel W. Butrymowicz, 
Loophole.com: How the FEC’s Failure to Fully Regulate the Internet Undermines Campaign 
Finance Law, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1708, 1714 (2009). Issue advocacy refers to “ads attacking 
candidates for their position on a specific issue rather than advocating their defeat.” Id. at 1715.  
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Reform Act (BCRA).22 Like FECA, BCRA was an expansion of 
disclosure standards, extending FECA’s disclosure requirements to 
corporations, labor unions, and individuals who fund “electioneering 
communications.”23 In 2003, the Supreme Court upheld this new ambit 
of regulations in McConnell v. FEC.24 Seven years later, the Court 
adhered to its McConnell pronouncements in Citizens United v. FEC, 
where the appellant sought to advertise a documentary it made about 
Hillary Clinton in anticipation of the 2008 U.S. presidential election.25 
The appellant in Citizens United challenged both a disclosure provision 
that would require it to submit an identification statement to the FEC and 
a provision mandating disclaimers during advertisements.26 The Court 
affirmed both requirements.27 In the Citizens United majority opinion, 
Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote, “With the advent of the Internet, prompt 
disclosure of expenditures can provide shareholders and citizens with the 
information needed to hold corporations and elected officials accountable 
for their positions and supporters.”28 By the time Citizens United was 
decided in 2010, the Internet had become the primary platform for 
campaign finance disclosure in the United States.29 The newfound 
accessibility of disclosure prompted the Cause of Action Institute to 
submit an amicus brief in McCutcheon that was dedicated to describing 
the changing technological climate:  
[T]he development of free, on-line disclosure reports and 
cumulative databases puts previously-inaccessible 
information at the fingertips of even the least sophisticated 
analysts. For example, the FEC maintains a free on-line 
                                                                                                                     
 22. Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002) (codified in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C., 12 
U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., 36 U.S.C., and 47 U.S.C.). This law is known as “the McCain-Feingold Act” 
after its two sponsors, Senators John McCain and Russ Feingold. McCain-Feingold Showdown, 
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 30, 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/03/30/opinion/mccain-feingold-
showdown.html. 
 23. Id. §§ 201–203. The BCRA defines an “electioneering communication” as a “broadcast, 
cable, or satellite communication” that mentions a candidate within sixty days of a general 
election or thirty days of a primary election. Id. § 201(3)(A). 
 24. 540 U.S. at 196, 201. Most interestingly, the Court seemed to recognize that a 
competing First Amendment right existed to counterbalance the desires of those who wished to 
contribute political money anonymously—“the competing First Amendment interests of 
individual citizens seeking to make informed choices in the political marketplace.” Id. at 197 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 25. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 887.  
 26. Id. at 913–14. 
 27. Id. at 914. 
 28. Id. at 916. 
 29. Cf. John M. de Figueiredo & Elizabeth Garrett, Paying for Politics, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 
591, 625–26 (2005) (“Bruce Bimber and Richard Davis identify 2000 as the year when the Internet 
began to dramatically affect political campaigns.”). 
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database of election contributions, often reported within 
hours of the contribution. The FEC makes available free data 
downloads for further data mining. The Department of 
Justice uses the FEC database as its primary research tool to 
uncover instances of campaign contribution abuse.30 
This is a far cry from how disclosure worked in the days when Buckley 
was decided. Prior to the advent of the Internet, disclosure reports were 
available only on paper.31 To obtain a disclosure report, one had to go to 
the Public Records Office of the FEC, which operated as a “store-front 
facility.”32 The first computer indices that would have been available 
when Buckley was decided were “primitive.”33 The paper system meant 
that the millions of pages generated by the FEC’s reporting requirements 
only reached a small number of people.34 
II.  MCCUTCHEON AND THE INCREASING POWER OF THE INTERNET 
Chief Justice John Roberts’s majority opinion in McCutcheon went 
even further than Justice Kennedy’s in Citizens United, stating that 
“disclosure of contributions minimizes the potential for abuse of the 
campaign finance system.”35 Justice Roberts dismissed Buckley’s 
characterization of disclosure requirements as “only a partial measure,” 
reasoning that the Internet now allows disclosure to be a much more 
potent tool against corruption than it had been when Buckley was 
decided.36 The existing system of campaign finance disclosure—the FEC-
operated online database that OpenSecrets.org and FollowTheMoney.org 
often accessed—“minimize[d] the potential for abuse of the campaign 
finance system.”37 The contribution limits at issue in McCutcheon may 
have been harsh enough to encourage politicians to hide any money in 
excess of those limits.38 Because of McCutcheon, the Internet is now 
offered as a self-sustaining legal argument in campaign finance litigation. 
The Internet’s existence is a standalone reason for the repeal of 
regulations developed at a time when the average person simply had no 
access to campaign finance information. It is, therefore, of paramount 
importance to address the limitations of what the Internet actually does 
for campaign finance disclosure.  
                                                                                                                     
 30. Cause of Action Brief, supra note 10, at 18 (footnotes omitted).  
 31. See FED. ELECTION COMM’N, FIRST TEN YEARS REPORT 9 (1985), available at 
http://fec.gov/pdf/firsttenyearsreport.pdf.  
 32. Id.  
 33. Id. 
 34. Cause of Action Brief, supra note 10, at 15. 
 35. McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1459 (2014). 
 36. Id. at 1460. 
 37. Id. at 1459–60. 
 38. See id. at 1460–61. 
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III.  THE LIMITS OF PURE DISCLOSURE 
Justice Roberts’s analysis of disclosure in McCutcheon is overly 
simplistic and potentially harmful to the future development of campaign 
finance laws. There are three problems that suggest the Court’s view—
that online disclosure of campaign finances will prevent corruption—
must not be used as a standalone reason for striking down election laws. 
The first problem with relying on internet disclosure is one of 
aggregation. Disclosing large amounts of data online presupposes that 
someone will actually examine that data. Unfortunately, the average voter 
is either uninterested or unwilling to do this legwork. The effectiveness 
of a campaign finance regime “relies on the willingness of intermediaries 
like the media or interest groups to examine the available information and 
present it to the public in a usable form before the election.”39 In 2007, 
Professor Dick M. Carpenter II conducted a study on the effectiveness of 
disclosure in ballot issue elections.40 Part of the study was a three-
question survey designed to measure knowledge and use of disclosure 
information.41 According to Carpenter, “[l]ess than half of respondents 
reported being informed about laws governing contributions to issue 
campaigns,” and just over one-third of respondents actually “knew where 
to access lists of campaign contributors” or read these lists before casting 
their vote.42 This lack of knowledge, however, did not correlate at all with 
respondents’ support for general campaign finance disclosure, suggesting 
that “citizens appear to know nothing about a law they strongly support 
and appear uninterested in accessing the information it produces.”43  
The most apparent reason for this inaction is the volume of 
information available.44 Even candidates who run for minor positions 
have many contributors to report.45 The cost of determining which donors 
                                                                                                                     
 39. Briffault, supra note 12, at 288.  
 40. Dick M. Carpenter II, Disclosure Costs: Unintended Consequences of Campaign 
Finance Reform, INST. FOR JUSTICE 11 (2007), https://www.ij.org/images/pdf_folder/other_pubs 
/DisclosureCosts.pdf. 
 41. Id. at 11 tbl.2. The three questions, framed as propositions that respondents had to agree 
or disagree with, were:  
1) I am informed about the laws governing contributions to ballot issue 
campaigns in the state; 2) I know where to access lists of those who contribute 
to ballot issue campaigns in my state; 3) Before I vote on ballot issues, I usually 
check out the list of contributors to the respective campaigns. 
Id. 
 42. Id.  
 43. Id. at 11, 20 n.39. 
 44. Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Disclosures About Disclosure, 44 IND. L. REV. 255, 266 (2010). 
 45. Id.  
6
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on a massive list are likely to create corruption is too high for the average 
voter.46  
Individual voters’ reluctance to sift through the disclosure information 
is compounded by intermediaries who will do the work for them. In the 
age of paper disclosure reports, voters often relied on journalists to attain 
and process the information.47 The modern age is no different in that 
respect, with journalists, traditional news networks, and online pundits 
sifting through the FEC’s online database.48 Professor Richard Briffault 
notes that “[t]he real benefit from disclosure may be public education 
generally rather than voter information specifically. When collected and 
analyzed by reporters, bloggers, scholars, good government 
organizations, and competing interest groups . . . disclosure reports can 
help provide a vital primer on the influence of money in law. . . .”49  
If, however, the true benefit of online disclosure is having campaign 
disclosure data disseminated by third parties, then some degree of bias in 
that data’s presentation seems unavoidable. For example, the good-
government organizations responsible for a great deal of the disclosure 
of “money in politics” also have their own agenda—promoting generally 
stricter campaign regulations.50 Traditional media abounds with 
examples of poor presentation of campaign finance information. The 
work of Professor Stephen Ansolabehere, Erik C. Snowberg, and 
Professor James M. Snyder Jr. suggests that voters already have a skewed 
perception of campaign finance that correlates with media coverage.51 
Ansolabehere, Snowberg, and Snyder compared newspaper coverage of 
expenditures and contributions with the actual contribution and 
expenditure figures.52 Their results suggest that newspapers were not 
presenting accurate information.53 The study also noted that: 
“Expenditures reported in the papers are approximately three to five times 
larger than the reality. The amounts spent on television advertising are 
                                                                                                                     
 46. Justin M. Sadowsky, The Transparency Myth: A Conceptual Approach to Corruption 
and the Impact of Mandatory Disclosure Laws, 4 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 308, 332 (2005). 
 47. See, e.g., Wayne Barrett, City for Sale: Ed Koch and the Betrayal of New York, THE 
NATION INST. (Jan. 30, 2015), http://www.nationinstitute.org/featuredwork/books/1287/city_for_ 
sale:_ed_koch_and_the_betrayal_of_new_york/. 
 48. See Mayer, supra note 44, at 267 (“MSNBC sifted through federal contributor data to 
identify journalists who had made federal political contributions, often in apparent violation of 
their employers’ stated policies.”). 
 49. Briffault, supra note 12, at 299. 
 50. Robert F. Bauer, Not Just a Private Matter: The Purposes of Disclosure in an Expanded 
Regulatory System, 6 ELECTION L.J. 38, 52–53 (2007). 
 51. Stephen Ansolabehere, Erik C. Snowberg & James M. Snyder Jr., Unrepresentative 
Information: The Case of Newspaper Reporting on Campaign Finance, 69 PUB. OP. Q. 213 
(2005). 
 52. Id. at 227. 
 53. Id. 
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much smaller than reported. And congressional challengers spend much, 
much less than is presented in the press.”54 Political blogs that use 
campaign finance information are often nakedly biased in their political 
leanings.55 If these blogs were to act as middlemen between the public 
and the FEC, then they might frame the campaign finance information to 
suit their ideology. 
The second problem with using internet disclosure as a standalone 
reason for striking down campaign finance regulations is that disclosure 
does not actually empower voters to do anything. A voter has no recourse 
to take action against an unsavory organization donating to a political 
candidate. Unlike the FEC, a voter has no power to impose sanctions on 
a candidate for corruption.56 One vote hardly has the stopping power of 
the contribution ceilings at issue in McCutcheon.57 Consequently, even 
when a voter has knowledge of potentially illegal donations, there is little 
a single voter can do about it. The problem becomes acute when 
considering “bet hedging.”58 A donor might give money to sources in 
multiple parties, to multiple candidates within the same party, or to 
competing candidates in the same election cycle.59 In such a situation, the 
voter is stripped of any genuine power. Apart from hedging, campaign 
finance may not be as important to voters as other issues. If a candidate 
                                                                                                                     
 54. Id. at 219. The researchers’ findings on contributions were equally troubling. Ansolabehere 
and his coauthors asked 1200 adults to estimate the sources and amounts of House of 
Representatives campaign funds. Id. at 225. Respondents believed that interest groups contributed 
fifty percent more money than individuals, but in fact individual contributions account for more 
than half of all reported contributions to House and Senate races. Id. at 226. Perhaps the most 
telling part of the research is that the margins of the respondents’ overestimations were equivalent 
to the overestimations in the newspapers. Id. at 225. 
 55. There are far too many examples to list of political blogs that either openly market 
themselves as favoring one side of the political spectrum or have authors with well-known 
political leanings. See, e.g., DAILY KOS, http://www.dailykos.com/ (last visited July 1, 2015); 
GATEWAY PUNDIT, http://www.thegatewaypundit.com/ (last visited July 1, 2015); HOTAIR, 
http://www.hotair.com/ (last visited July 1, 2015); VOLOKH CONSPIRACY, http://www.washington 
post.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/ (last visited July 1, 2015); THINKPROGRESS, http://thinkprogress. 
org/ (last visited July 1, 2015).  
 56. Briffault, supra note 12, at 288–89. 
 57. Id.; McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1460 (2014). 
 58. Jason Cohen, The Same Side of Two Coins: The Peculiar Phenomenon of Bet-Hedging 
in Campaign Finance, 26 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 271, 275 (2006) (discussing the practice of donors 
contributing to competing parties or candidates so that the donor enjoys some benefit regardless 
of who wins the election).  
 59. Id. at 274. There are many somewhat speculative reasons as to why donors hedge their 
bets in elections. The most cynical rationale would be ex-post favor seeking—a donor believing 
that each candidate in a race is able and willing to give him some kind of political favor. Id. at 
306. A donor could also donate to multiple candidates to express neutrality or to promote 
democracy. Id. at 307. But for this Comment’s purposes, the result is the same. 
8
Florida Law Review, Vol. 67, Iss. 4 [2016], Art. 6
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol67/iss4/6
2015] CASE COMMENT 1521 
 
is funded by suspect donors but takes a favorable social stance, then 
voters may still vote for that candidate, despite the perceived corruption.60 
The final problem with internet disclosure as a standalone reason for 
striking down campaign finance regulations is that disclosure may 
discourage participation, particularly donations to an unpopular cause. As 
a result, political money may avoid the spotlight and rely on backchannels 
rather than traditional avenues. In this way, too much disclosure may 
actually decrease transparency. The Supreme Court acknowledged the 
idea that disclosure decreases participation in NAACP v. Alabama.61 In 
that case, there was significant evidence that membership in the NAACP 
led to retaliation against the members.62 Thus, the Court found that 
compulsory disclosure of the NAACP’s members infringed on the 
members’ freedom of association.63 The Buckley Court acknowledged 
that disclosure has a chilling effect on political participation, at least in 
terms of disclosure requirements for minor parties and independents.64  
A clear example of the way disclosure may chill political participation 
is the Proposition 8 ballot initiative in California.65 Because of 
Proposition 8’s unpopularity, supporters of the measure became targets 
for death threats.66 “[A]version to public exposure particularly deters 
                                                                                                                     
 60. Briffault explained this dilemma by using an example from the Clinton/Dole election 
of 1996: “[Voters] could not vote for Dole on campaign finance, or on character, and for Clinton 
on economic policy or health care reform, but rather had to combine all their conflicting 
concerns . . . . The vote is simply too blunt an instrument . . . .” Briffault, supra note 12, at 289. 
 61. 357 U.S. 449 (1958). 
 62. Id. at 462.  
 63. Id.  
 64. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 71–72 (1976). In fact, the Court respected the threat of 
chilling to such a degree that the standard for disclosure exemption is reasonableness. Id. at 74. 
For an example of the Court applying reasonableness in this context, see Brown v. Socialist 
Workers ’74 Campaign Comm. (Ohio), 459 U.S. 87 (1982) (holding that disclosure requirements 
applied to a minor party would subject the members to a serious threat of retaliation). Concededly, 
the Supreme Court has upheld contribution limits over the First Amendment interest in anonymity 
before. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 914–16 (2010); McConnell v. FEC, 540 
U.S. 93, 194–202 (2003); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 60–74. However, the laxity of the standard is, if 
nothing else, an indicator that chilling must be considered. 
 65. Proposition 8 was a 2008 ballot measure that banned gay marriage in California through 
amendment of the state’s constitution. Petitioners’ Brief at 2, Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811 (2010) 
(No. 09-559), 2010 WL 711186. The measure immediately set off a firestorm in California, a 
comparatively liberal state. Eric McGhee & Daniel Krimm, California’s Political Geography, PUB. 
POLICY INST. OF CAL. (Feb. 2012), http://www.ppic.org/main/publication_quick. 
asp?i=1007. Pursuant to California law at the time, the names and zip codes of all donors to the 
initiative were posted online and made publically accessible. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 2, § 18550 
(2006). 
 66. See Andres Araiza, Prop 8 Threat: Fresno Police Close to Arrest, ABC-30 (Oct. 31, 
2008, 12:00 AM), http://abc30.com/archive/6479879/ (discussing a death threat directed at the 
Fresno mayor for his support of Proposition 8). A federal court did eventually hold that the number 
9
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persons from associating themselves with causes that are unpopular or 
unconventional.”67 Naturally, disclosure may divert some stereotypically 
large and “corrupt” contributors, but most donations to U.S. House and 
Senate races are small.68 And large donors can simply bet on both 
candidates to hedge and mitigate any backlash, whereas a smaller donor 
may not be able to afford two donations to two candidates. Thus, the 
chilling effect of disclosure mostly hurts small donors with unorthodox 
views. The outcome will likely be disengagement from the contribution 
process or increased use of backchannels.69 Pushing donors to give their 
money to organizations with no reporting requirements runs counter to 
the purpose of disclosure. 
CONCLUSION 
Disclosure was once considered a limited means of deterrence at best. 
The average voter was unable to access paper campaign disclosure 
reports due to technological constraints. Today, voters have the opposite 
problem. Voters have more information than they know (or care to know) 
what to do with. Despite these limitations, the brave new world of 
technologically-empowered campaign finance is now being used as an 
independent and sufficient reason to strike down campaign finance laws. 
If the Court is to put forward technological process as grounds for 
reforming antiquated laws, then, at the very least, it must acknowledge 
the limitations of mere disclosure as a deterrent to corruption.  
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small fry. Their negligible influence poses little danger of corruption, however defined.” Id. at 30 
(footnote omitted). 
 69. An example of this is the 501(c)(4), an organization used in recent years to avoid 
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